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Cleaning Up Jurisdiction: Divining
Congressional Intent of Clean Air Act
Section 307(b)
Kevin 0. Leske

In a span offive days in 2014, panels of the U.S. Courts ofAppeals for the
Tenth and Seventh Circuits reached opposite conclusions on whether certain
limitations on judicial review found in section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act
were jurisdictional.Specifically, the courts disagreed as to whether the filing
deadline and the venue rules implicatedthe courts'subject-matterjurisdiction.
The characterizationof a rule as jurisdictionalis farfrom semantic or academic. Whether a requirement is jurisdictional raises significant practical,
doctrinal,and constitutionalconcerns. These issues includefairness, uniformity, andjudicial efficiency, as well as fidelity to Article III of the U.S. Constitution and the sovereign immunity doctrine. Accordingly, this Article analyzes
whether the filing deadline and the venue rules in section 307(b)(1) of the
Clean Air Act arejurisdictional.
First,this Article distinguishesjurisdictionaland non-jurisdictionalrules.
Next, it gives a background of the Clean Air Act and section 307(b), and discusses the various decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals to explain the key
views on whether the limitations are jurisdictional.Finally, it applies recent
Supreme Court guidance to assess whether the filing deadline and the venue
rules in section 307(b)(1) arejurisdictional.By examining the text of the provision, its context, and its historical treatment, the Article concludes that: (1) the
filing deadline requirementfor judicial review is jurisdictional, (2) the venue
rule that authorizes only the courts of appeals to entertainpetitions isjurisdictional, and (3) the venue rule that directs some petitionsfor review to the D.C.
Circuitand others to the local circuit court is notjurisdictional. These conclusions are buttressed by the goals and policies of the Clean Air Act, canons of
statutory construction, bedrock civil procedure and administrative law principles, as well as sovereign immunity and core Article III concerns.
Copyright © 2015 Regents of the University of California.
*

Associate Professor of Law, Barry University Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law. I would

like to thank Ecology Law Quarterly editors and staff for their excellent work on this Article. I also am
grateful to Dean Leticia Diaz of Barry University Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law for her support.

ECOLOGY LA W QUARTERLY

[Vol. 42:37

Introduction .................................................................................................
. . 38
I. Jurisdictional and Non-Jurisdictional Provisions ............................. 42
A . Introduction ...............................................................................
42
B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Non-Jurisdictional Provisions ..... 43
II. Clean Air Act Section 307(b)(1) ........................................................
44
A . Introduction ...............................................................................
44
B. The Federal Clean Air Act and Section 307(b)(1) ..................... 44
C. The Case Law Addressing Clean Air Act Section 307(b)(1) ......... 47
1. The Supreme Court's Cases Citing to Section 307(b)(1) ........ 47
2. The Seventh Circuit's Decision in Clean Water Action
Council of Northeastern Wisconsin, Inc. v. EPA ................ 48
3. The Tenth Circuit's Decision in Utah v. EPA .................... 51
4. The D.C. Circuit's Opinions Analyzing Section 307(b)(1) ..... 55
III. Analysis of Clean Air Act Section 307(b)(1)'s Filing Deadline and
V enue R ules ......................................................................................
58
A . Introduction ...............................................................................
58
B. The Supreme Court's Framework .............................................
59
C. Plain Language of Clean Air Act Section 307 ........................... 60
D. Filing Deadline Requirement in Section 307(b)(1) .................... 61
1. The Text of the Filing Deadline Requirement in Section
307(b)(1) .............................................................................
61
2. The Context of the Filing Deadline Requirement ................ 64
3. The Historical Treatment of Filing Deadlines ......................... 67
E. The Venue Rules in Section 307(b)(1) .......................................
68
1. The Text of the Venue Rules in Section 307(b)(1) .............. 69
a. The Venue Rule with Respect to the Exclusive
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts of Appeals ............... 69
b. The Venue Rule with Respect to the Proper Circuit
Court of Appeals ...........................................................
70
2. The Context of the Venue Rule within the Clean Air Act ....... 73
3. The Historical Treatment of Venue Rules ........................... 75
C onclusion ...................................................................................................
. . 76

INTRODUCTION

The judicial review provisions in the Clean Air Act (CAA) are found in
section 307(b)(1). 1 This section, first enacted in 1970, sets forth a series of requirements for judicial review of actions of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), including a sixty-day filing deadline and a venue requirement
that not only mandates that petitions for review be filed in the courts of appeals,
but further directs that certain petitions be heard in the U.S. Court of Appeals

1.

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2012).
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for the D.C. Circuit. There is a circuit split as to whether section 307(b)(1) and
these requirements are jurisdictional.
And this characterization is far from academic. Jurisdictional statutory
provisions implicate significant practical, doctrinal, and constitutional concerns. These issues include fairness, uniformity, and judicial efficiency, as well
as fidelity to Article III of the U.S. Constitution and the sovereign immunity
doctrine. As the Supreme Court recently declared, the characterization of "a
rule as jurisdictional renders it unique in our adversarial system." 2 Federal
courts are, for the most part, cabined to adjudicating the parties' claims. 3 However, because federal courts have an independent duty to ensure that they act
within the bounds of the jurisdiction granted by Congress and the U.S. Constitution, they must examine jurisdictional arguments either overlooked or not advanced by the parties. 4 Thus, unlike non-jurisdictional rules, an objection to a
court's subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even where a party
has previously agreed that a tribunal has jurisdiction. 5 After losing at trial, a
party is therefore entitled to seek dismissal of the action based on a defect in
6
subject-matter jurisdiction.
The practical effects of this doctrine are easy to identify: "Tardy jurisdictional objections can therefore result in a waste of adjudicatory resources and
can disturbingly disarm litigants." 7 If a party correctly identifies a defect in
subject-matter jurisdiction, "many months of work on the part of the attorneys
and the court may be wasted." 8 As one commentator quipped: "Horror stories
abound of cases reversed after lengthy trials because of late-discovered defects"
9
in subject-matter jurisdiction.
Indeed, the seminal cases Louisville & Nashville RailroadCo. v. Mottley'
and Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,'' taught in virtually every civil procedure class in this country, are prime examples of the harshness of requiring courts to address subject-matter jurisdiction at any stage in the proceeding. 12 In both cases, a higher court dismissed the case on appeal because the
trial court had lacked jurisdiction, thereby negating the lower court's decision
on the merits. 13 In fact, the same commentator mused whether the defendant in
2. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013).
3. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1201 (2011) (citing SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 356-57 (2006)).
4. Id. (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)).
5. Sebelius, 133 S.Ct. at 824.
6. Shinseki, 131 S.Ct. at 1202 (citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 508).
7. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 817 (citing Shinseki, 131 S.Ct. at 1197); see also Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at
514.
8. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. at 1201.
9. Jessica Berch, Waving Goodbye to Non-Waivability: The Case for Permitting Waiver of
Statutory Subject-MatterJurisdictionDefects, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 635, 637 (2014).
10. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
11. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
12. Berch, supra note 9, at 651.
13. Id. at 637.
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Kroger "knew it had a jurisdictional trump card and waited to play it [until] the
case began to go badly for it, thereby supporting gamesmanship as a litigation
14
strategy."
Moreover, the classification of a particular requirement as "jurisdictional"
precludes courts from applying equitable doctrines, such as "good cause," to
excuse a defect in order to avoid unfair results. 15 The doctrine's inflexibility
therefore prevents courts from using its traditional equitable power to waive the
strict requirements of subject-matter jurisdiction in the appropriate circumstances. 16
With these criticisms in mind, some commentators argue that certain requirements should instead be construed as non-jurisdictional "claim processing
rules." These "rules merely prescribe the method by which the jurisdiction
granted the courts by Congress is to be exercised. '1 7 Unlike jurisdictional rules,
these rules must be raised at particular times or are waived. 18 Waivability promotes efficiency and fairness, and prevents the loss of precious judicial resources. 19
There are, however, equally strong arguments why certain "claim processing" rules should retain jurisdictional attributes. The first point lies with the
"core" attribute of federal subject-matter jurisdiction: Article III, section 2 of
the U.S. Constitution. That section empowers Congress to establish the subjectmatter jurisdiction of federal courts. It naturally follows that Congress "can also
'20
determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear [cases]."
Basic goals of administrative law are also served by construing such requirements, like a filing deadline to challenge a regulation, as jurisdictional.
For example, these deadlines serve "the important purpose of imparting finality
into the administrative process." 2 1 This finality not only conserves administra-

14. Id. at 654. Kroger addressed whether the defendant's principal place of business could be
used for purposes of determining whether the parties were diverse. 437 U.S. at 369 n.5 ("The problem
apparently was one of geography. Although the Missouri River generally marks the boundary between
Iowa and Nebraska, Carter Lake, Iowa, where the accident occurred and where Owen had its main office, lies west of the river, adjacent to Omaha, Neb. Apparently the river once avulsed at one of its
bends, cutting Carter Lake off from the rest of Iowa.").
15. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013) (finding that where a rule is
jurisdictional, "[n]ot only could there be no equitable tolling," but a "regulation providing for a goodcause extension" would also be invalid).
16. See Berch, supra note 9, at 654.
17. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) (citing 12 CHARLES WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER &
RICHARD MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3141 (2d ed. 1997)).

18. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011) (citing SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 356-57 (2006)).
19. Id. (citing Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 356-57) ("Jurisdictional rules may also result in the
waste of judicial resources and may unfairly prejudice litigants. For purposes of efficiency and fairness,
our legal system is replete with rules requiring that certain matters be raised at particular times.").
20. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007) (citing United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. 106, 113
(1848)).
21.
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 666 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
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tive resources, but also protects "the reliance interests of regulatees who con' 22
form their conduct to the regulations."
With these pros and cons in mind, the Supreme Court has attempted as a
matter of doctrine "to bring some discipline to the use" of the term "jurisdiction" by the courts. 23 The Court has criticized lower courts for failing to appreciate "the distinction between two sometimes confused or conflated concepts:
federal-court 'subject-matter' jurisdiction over a controversy; and the essential
ingredients of a federal claim for relief," such as claim-processing rules. 24 But
the Court has created part of this confusion with its own imprecision. For example, it has described "a nonextendable time limit as 'mandatory and jurisdictional,' 25 but later clarified that some "time prescriptions, however emphatic,
'are not properly typed 'jurisdictional.'"'26
The Court has therefore cautioned that "even rules that are mandatory
should not be called 'jurisdictional' unless they implicate the court's very authority to adjudicate a case," such as the limits imposed by subject-matter jurisdiction. 27 Thus, in order to determine whether a rule should be regarded as jurisdictional, the Court has developed a "readily administrable bright line" to
assess the statutory limitation. 28 Absent this clarity, the Court has directed
courts to construe the requirement as non-jurisdictional in character. 29 But the
Court has warned that Congress needs not "incant magic words in order to
speak clearly." 30 Courts perform an analysis of congressional intent to determine whether a particular requirement should be jurisdictional. 3 1 In the absence
of definitive jurisdictional language, courts should analyze the legal character
of the requirement, "as shown through [the requirement's] text, context, and
32
historical treatment."
In other words, after analyzing the text of the requirement in question, including its legislative history, courts should look to how the provision operates

22. Id.
23. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013) (citing Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. at
1202); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (noting that jurisdiction
has been a "word of many, too many, meanings").
24. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006).
25. Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)).
26. Id.; Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 414 (2004); accord Eberhart v. United States, 546
U.S. 12, 16-19 (2005); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454-55 (2004); see also Carlisle v. United
States, 517 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
27. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. at 1202-03 (citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnik, 559 U.S. 154, 160-62
(2010)); see also Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 160.
28. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824 (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516),
29. Id. (citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648-49
(2012).
30. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824 (citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16).
31. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. at 1204 ("[W]e attempt to ascertain Congress' intent regarding the particular type of review at issue in this case.").
32.
Utah v. EPA, 765 F.3d 1257, 1257 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 166
(citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982))).
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in the overall statutory scheme and how the Court has interpreted "similar provisions in many years past."' 33 These factors will be instructive of Congress's
intent to make a particular provision or statutory requirement implicate the sub34
ject-matter jurisdiction of the courts.
Accordingly, Part I of this Article distinguishes jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional requirements. Part II first gives a background of the CAA and
section 307(b)(1) and then analyzes the recent Seventh and Tenth Circuit decisions, as well as decisions by the D.C. Circuit, to explain key views on whether
the limitations are jurisdictional. Part III then applies recent Supreme Court
guidance to analyze whether the filing deadline and venue rules in section
307(b)(1) are jurisdictional. It examines the text of the provision, its context,
and its historical treatment. This Article concludes that: (1) the filing deadline
requirement on judicial review is jurisdictional, (2) the venue rule that authorizes only the courts of appeals to entertain petitions is jurisdictional, and (3) the
venue rule that directs some petitions for review to the D.C. Circuit and others
to the local circuit court is not jurisdictional. These conclusions accord with the
goals and structure of the CAA, canons of statutory construction, bedrock civil
procedure and administrative law principles, as well as sovereign immunity and
core Article III concerns.
I.

JURISDICTIONAL AND NON-JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS

A.

Introduction

What exactly does it mean for a provision (or requirement within a provision) to be "jurisdictional"? This Part provides a brief background of subjectmatter jurisdiction and non-jurisdictional provisions, which although arguably
"clear in theory ...can be confusing in practice." 35
Courts have "sometimes mischaracterized claim-processing rules or elements of a cause of action as jurisdictional limitations." 36 This mistake has
been especially prevalent when characterization of that rule or requirement
"was not central to the case, and thus did not require close analysis." 37 Indeed,
even the Supreme Court has admitted that it has generated confusion by the
"less than meticulous" usage of the term "jurisdictional" in its cases. 38 And
even where necessary to undertake this analysis, drawing this distinction can be
especially difficult "because Congress is free to attach the conditions that go

33. Sebelius, 133 S.Ct. at 824 (citing Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 168); see also John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34 (2008).
34. Sebelius, 133 S.Ct. at 824.
35. Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 161.
36. Id at 154 (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511-12 (2006) (citing examples));
see Steel Co.v.Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (citing examples).
37. Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 154 (citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511-12).
38. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15 (2005) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,
454 (2004)).
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with the jurisdictional label to a rule that [courts] would prefer to call a claim39
processing rule."
In the Court's view, "[c]larity would be facilitated if courts and litigants
used the label 'jurisdictional' not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions" that are rooted in the courts' adjudicatory authority, such as their
subject-matter jurisdiction. 40 To advance this goal, the Court has endeavored in
recent cases to restrict "drive-by jurisdictional rulings" that overlook the "critical differences between true jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdictional lim41
itations on causes of action."
B.

Subject-MatterJurisdictionand Non-JurisdictionalProvisions

"Jurisdiction" refers to "a court's adjudicatory authority." 42 It is axiomatic
that the federal courts are of limited jurisdiction: Article III, section 2 of the
43
U.S. Constitution establishes the cases to which the judicial power extends.
Thus, properly applied, the term "jurisdictional" encompasses the "'prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction)' . .. implicat44
ing that authority."
Subject-matter jurisdiction, however, is not only established by the U.S.
Constitution; it is also defined by Congress. As the Supreme Court has declared: "The notion of subject-matter jurisdiction obviously extends to classes
of cases ... falling within a court's adjudicatory authority, but it is no less 'jurisdictional' when Congress prohibits federal courts from adjudicating an oth45
erwise legitimate 'class of cases' by establishing requirements via statute.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is therefore both an Article III and a statutory requirement, and "no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction
upon a federal court." 4 6 In other words, subject-matter jurisdiction, properly
comprehended, denotes a court's "power to hear a case," which "can never be
forfeited or waived."'47 This is why an argument that subject-matter jurisdiction

39. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011) (citing Bowles v.
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212-13 (2007)).
40. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455.
41. Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 161 (citations omitted) (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456); Steel
Co., 523 U.S. at 91.
42. Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 160 (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455).
§ 2; Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
43. See U.S. CONST. art. III,
("As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with examination of our jurisdiction.").
44. Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 160-61 (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455); see also Steel Co.,
523 U.S. at 89 ("[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction ...[refers to] the courts' statutory or constitutional power
to adjudicate the case.").
45. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (quoting Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12,
16 (2005) (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455)).
46. Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Ins. Corp. of
Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)).
47. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm., 558 U.S. 67,
81-82 (2009) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (quoting United States v.
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002))).
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is lacking can be brought by any party, or by a court sua sponte at any time dur48
ing the litigation, including after trial and the entry of judgment.
By contrast, Congress can also enforce "claim-processing rules" that do
not "speak to the power of the court" but rather establish "the rights or obligations of the parties" when they are before a court. 4 9 Such rules are designed "to
promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times." 50 Although such rules are generally "unalterable on a party's application," they "can nonetheless be forfeited
if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point." 5 1 For example,
if a party fails to assert that a rival's complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted," under Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), it may not
be asserted after trial. 5 2 Similarly, venue rules and statutes of limitations can be
53
waived in the absence of a timely argument.
II.

CLEAN AIR ACT SECTION 307(b)(1)

A.

Introduction

This Part provides a background of the Federal CAA and section
307(b)(1). It then analyzes recent Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuit decisions to
explain key views on whether the limitations in question are jurisdictional.
B.

The Federal Clean Air Act and Section 307(b)(1)

In the 1970 CAA Amendments, Congress established "a comprehensive
national program that made the States and the Federal Government partners in
the struggle against air pollution." 54 The CAA regulates air pollution by establishing air quality standards for certain pollutants and controlling the emissions
of specified hazardous pollutants. 55 Congress vested EPA with the primary responsibility to administer the CAA. With respect to the review of EPA final action, the CAA establishes two methods of review. Section 307 governs

48. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506; see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at
any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.").
49. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) ("[J]urisdictional statutes 'speak to
the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties."' (quoting Republic Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 100 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring))).
50. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011) (citing Union Pac.
R.R. Co., 558 U.S. at 82-83).
51.
Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15 (2005) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,
456 (2004)).
52. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506-07; see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
53. See FED. R.Civ. P. 12(h)(1) (specifying circumstances in which objections to improper venue
and legal defenses, such as a statute of limitation, are waived).
54. Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7412 (2012).
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"[a]dministrative proceedings and judicial review," while section 304 authoriz56
es "citizen suits" against EPA in district court.
At issue here is section 307(b), which addresses judicial review. Section
307(b)(1) contains five sentences, each of which serves a distinct function. The
first sentence of section 307(b)(1) provides that a petition for review challenging specific actions, such as EPA's promulgation of national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS) and standards of performance, "may be filed only in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." 5 7 Furthermore, it
also specifies that "any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or
final action taken" by EPA are included in the category of cases that must be
filed in the D.C. Circuit. 58 This is one of the venue provisions at issue here.
The second sentence of section 307(b)(1) addresses judicial review of
EPA actions that are "locally or regionally applicable." 59 Such actions "may be
60
filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit."
The actions specified in this sentence include EPA's approval of state implementation plans (SIPs), certain EPA orders, and enhanced monitoring and
compliance certification programs. 61 Like the preceding sentence, it also casts a
wide net by specifying that "any other final action ...which is locally or regionally applicable" must be filed in the appropriate circuit. 62 Thus, the section

56.
57.

Id. §§ 7604, 7607.
The first sentence of CAA section 307(b)(1) states:
A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any national
primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard or requirement under section 7412 of this title, any standard of performance or requirement under section 7411 of this title,[ ] any standard under section 7521 of
this title (other than a standard required to be prescribed under section 7521 (b)(1)
of this title), any determination under section 7521(b)(5) of this title, any control
or prohibition under section 7545 of this title, any standard under section 7571 of
this title, any rule issued under section 7413, 7419, or under section 7420 of this
title, or any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action
taken, by the Administrator under this chapter may be filed only in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
§ 7607(b)(1).
58. Id.
59. The full sentence is:
A petition for review of the Administrator's action in approving or promulgating
any implementation plan under section 7410 of this title or section 7411 (d) of this
title, any order under section 7411(j) of this title, under section 7412 of this title,
under section 7419 of this title, or under section 7420 of this title, or his action
under section 1857c-10(c)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of this title (as in effect before August 7, 1977) or under regulations thereunder, or revising regulations for enhanced monitoring and compliance certification programs under section
7414(a)(3) of this title, or any other final action of the Administrator under this
chapter (including any denial or disapproval by the Administrator under subchapter I of this chapter) which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in
the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit.
Id
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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requires review of covered EPA actions to be in the court of appeals rather than
the district courts.
The third sentence qualifies the second sentence by requiring actions that
EPA has determined have a "nationwide scope or effect" to be filed only in the
D.C. Circuit. 63 However, EPA must make an affirmative finding and publish
"that such action is based on such a determination."64 Thus, this sentence effectively allows EPA to redirect cases to the D.C. Circuit that might have other65
wise been properly brought "locally or [in] regional" circuit courts.
The fourth sentence contains the filing deadline at issue here. 66 It provides:
Any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed
within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation,
approval, or action appears in the Federal Register, except that
if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such
sixtieth day, then any petition for review under this subsection
67
shall be filed within sixty days after such grounds arise.
Thus, the sentence establishes a filing deadline of sixty days, but allows
petitions to be filed after the deadline if new "grounds" occur subsequent to the
68
expiration of the period for judicial review.
The fifth and final sentence of the section makes clear that should a petition for reconsideration of a rule or action be filed with EPA, the filing of that
petition for reconsideration does not: (1) affect finality of the rule or action for
purposes of judicial review, (2) extend the filing deadline for a petition for review in the courts of appeals, and (3) postpone the effectiveness of the rule or
69
action in question.

63.

The third sentence states:
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence a petition for review of any action referred to in such sentence may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia if such action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action the Administrator finds and publishes that such action is based on such a determination.

Id.
64.
65.
Builders
decision
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.EPA has argued that its finding is not subject to judicial review. See Am. Road & Transp.
Ass'n v. EPA, 705 F.3d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("As an initial matter, EPA asserts that its
whether to make such a finding is not judicially reviewable.").
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
Id.
Id.
The last sentence reads:
The filing of a petition for reconsideration by the Administrator of any otherwise
final rule or action shall not affect the finality of such rule or action for purposes
of judicial review nor extend the time within which a petition for judicial review
of such rule or action under this section may be filed, and shall not postpone the
effectiveness of such rule or action.
Id.Under other statutes, filing a petition for reconsideration with an agency effectively stays the rule or
action in question and delays judicial review because courts express finality, mootness, and ripeness
concerns.
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C. The Case Law Addressing Clean Air Act Section 307(b)(1)

The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether section 307(b)(1)
or any of its specific limitations are jurisdictional. Several courts of appeals,
however, have addressed whether section 307(b)'s timing deadline and venue
rules are jurisdictional, but have reached opposite conclusions. 70 The Seventh
Circuit, on one hand, recently held that the venue rules and filing deadline are
not jurisdictional. 7 1 The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, also recently analyzed section 307(b)(1) and joined the D.C. Circuit in finding that the filing
deadline is jurisdictional. 72 The opinions in these cases offer a good starting
point for analyzing the jurisdictional questions presented in Part III.
1.

The Supreme Court's Cases Citing to Section 307(b)(1)

Although the Supreme Court has not directly analyzed section 307(b)(1),
it has offered "drive-by jurisdictional rulings" on section 307 that do not have
precedential effect. 73 Two such cases were decided last term. For example, in
the first, EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.,74 the Court concluded that
a different subsection of CAA section 307 did not implicate the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the courts. 75 In the second, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,
the Court noted: "Numerous parties, including several States, filed petitions for
review in the D.C. Circuit under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b), challenging EPA's
76
greenhouse-gas-related actions."
Earlier cases also cite to section 307(b)(1) as a source of jurisdiction. In
Alaska v. EPA, the Court noted that "the Ninth Circuit concluded that it had adjudicatory authority pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), which lodges jurisdiction over challenges to 'any... final [EPA] action' in the Courts of Appeals." 77 The Court observed in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass 'ns that the
respondents had "challenged the new standards in the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). ' 78 And it also

70. See, e.g., Utah v. EPA, 765 F.3d 1257, 1258 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding that CAA section
307(b)(1)'s filing deadline is jurisdictional); Clean Water Action Council of Ne. Wis. v. EPA, 765 F.3d
749, 751 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding that CAA section 307(b)(1)'s venue and filing provisions are not jurisdictional).
71.
Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 751.
72. Utah, 765 F.3d at 1258; Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 740 F.3d 185, 191 (D.C. Cir.
2014); Med. Waste Inst. v. EPA, 645 F.3d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 459-60 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
73. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996); Fed. Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 97
(1994); United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952)).
74. 134 S.Ct. 1584, 1602-03 (2014) (quoting Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct.
817, 824 (2013)).
75. Id.
76.
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2438 (2014).
77. Alaska v. EPA, 244 F.3d 748, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2004).
78. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 463 (2001).
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addressed and rejected EPA's argument that the D.C. Circuit "lacked jurisdiction to review the EPA's implementation policy" because it was not final action
and not ripe for review. 79 It specifically noted that section 307(b)(1) "gives the
court jurisdiction over 'any... nationally applicable regulations promulgated,
80
or final action taken, by the Administrator.'
Finally, the Court cited section 307(b)(1) as jurisdictional in even older
cases such as Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, where
"[r]espondents filed a timely petition for review in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
7607(b)(1)." 81 Likewise, the Court in Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc. stated
that "Congress ...

vested the courts of appeals with jurisdiction under [42
82

U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)].
These cases demonstrate that the Court believes, as a general matter, that
section 307(b)(1) vests the courts of appeals with authority to hear challenges
governed by section 307(b)(1). The Court, however, has not analyzed and definitively ruled whether the filing deadline and venue rules within section
307(b)(1) are jurisdictional.
2.

The Seventh Circuit'sDecision in Clean Water Action Council of
Northeastern Wisconsin, Inc. v. EPA

In Clean Water Action Council of Northeastern Wisconsin, Inc. v. EPA,
Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, ruled that the venue rules and filing deadline
of CAA section 307(b)(1) were not jurisdictional. 83 The court explicitly recognized that both the Tenth and D.C. Circuits had reached the opposite conclusion. 84 In acknowledging that its decision created a conflict among the circuits,
it circulated the opinion to all the circuit judges in regular active service, but
85
none requested a hearing en banc.
At issue in Clean Water Action Council was Wisconsin's approval of
Georgia-Pacific's application for the renewal of a CAA operating permit issued
under Title V of the CAA for one of its paper mills. 86 Under Title V, certain
stationary sources of air pollution must have an operating permit. 87 These per-

79. Id. at 477.
80. Id.
81.
Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841 (1984).
82. Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 593 (1980).
83. Clean Water Action Council of Ne. Wis. v. EPA, 765 F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 2014).
84. Id. (noting that "[o]pinions from the Tenth and D.C. Circuits" supported the EPA's position
that the petitioner had "brought the challenge belatedly and in the wrong circuit").
85. Id. at 753 (citing Circuit Rule 40(e)).
86. Id. at 751. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f(2012) (Title V).
87.
§ 7661a(a).
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mits, which are mostly administered by states (but subject to EPA review), in88
clude applicable "pollution-control obligations" for such sources.
One of the "pollution-control obligations" specified in Georgia-Pacific's
permit is the maximum amount of "increments" (i.e., air pollution emissions) it
may emit under Wisconsin's SIP. 89 Created pursuant to the CAA, Wisconsin's
SIP is designed to ensure that the level of air pollution emitted within its borders is adequately controlled and allocated. 90 To that end, the CAA establishes
a baseline pollution level, which includes pollution from sources in operation
before 1975.91 It also sets a maximum "cap" above the baseline, called the
state's "allowance." 92 States, like Wisconsin here, then assign pollution "increments" to its sources, which when added together and to the baseline, must
93
stay below the allowance.
While Georgia-Pacific's Title V renewal permit for its paper mill was
pending, the company sought and received permission to modify the same mill,
which it had constructed before 1975.94 After Wisconsin renewed the existing
permit, the Clean Water Action Council petitioned EPA to intervene and object. 95 The Council argued that Wisconsin's regulations and the regulations'
application to Georgia-Pacific violated the CAA. 96 Specifically, the Council
argued that Georgia-Pacific's pre-1975 emissions lost their "grandfathered" status when Georgia-Pacific modified its facility, and Wisconsin should have been
97
required to count all the mill's emissions as increments against its allowance.
EPA rejected the Council's request, finding Wisconsin's interpretation of
the CAA consistent with its own understanding of the statute. 98 Under EPA's
interpretation, a modification to a pre-1975 facility does not convert the whole
plant's emissions into increments that must be counted against the state's allowance. 9 9 Rather, only the increase in emissions caused by the modification
should be used. 10 0 The Council then petitioned the Seventh Circuit under sec10 1
tion 307(b) of the CAA for review of EPA's order declining to object.

88. See § 7661(4) (defining "permitting authority"); Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at
750-51.
89. Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 750-51. See generally § 7410 (SIP provisions).
90. See Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 750 (explaining SIPs in general).
91.
§ 7479(4).
92. Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 750; see § 7410 (SIP provisions).
93. See Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 750.
94. See id. at 751.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.(citing Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods. LP Plant, 2012 EPA CAA Title V LEXIS 7).
99. Id.; see Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) for Particulate Matter Less Than 2.5
Micrometers (PM 2. 5)-lncrements, Significant Impact Levels (SILs) and Significant Monitoring Concentration (SMC), 75 Fed. Reg. 64,864 (Oct. 20, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52).
100. Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 751; see 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,864.
101. Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 751; see 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2012).
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The court first addressed EPA's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction.10 2 EPA argued that the Council's suit challenged EPA's 2010 regulations,
which, as "nationally applicable regulations," could be challenged only in the
D.C. Circuit and only within sixty days of publication.10 3 EPA asserted that the
court lacked the authority to hear the case "because the Council brought the
challenge belatedly and in the wrong circuit."104
Although the court recognized that decisions by the Tenth and D.C. Circuits supported EPA's argument, it found that these venue and filing requirements were not jurisdictional. 10 5 The court found that EPA had incorrectly applied the Supreme Court's case law on the difference between jurisdictional
rules and claim-processing rules. 10 6 In the panel's view, rules establishing
"venue" have "long been understood as non-jurisdictional."' 1 7 Likewise, it asserted that the Supreme Court has found that most filing deadlines are viewed
either as statutes of limitations or as claim-processing rules, and therefore not
08
jurisdictional in nature. 1
The court then construed the Supreme Court's recent cases as requiring a
"clear statement" or "clear indication" from Congress before the court could
deem a particular prerequisite as jurisdictional. 10 9 After canvassing both the
EPA and Georgia-Pacific briefs and the Tenth and D.C. Circuit opinions to find
a clear statement from Congress, the Seventh Circuit concluded that no such
statement could be found.' 10 It therefore held that the statute was not jurisdictional.' 11
In its review of the other circuits' opinions, the Seventh Circuit focused on
one case: Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 112 There, the D.C. Circuit stated that filing deadlines serve "the important
purpose of imparting finality into the administrative process." 1 13 The D.C. Circuit noted that filing deadlines conserve administrative resources and protect

102. Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 751 ("Jurisdiction comes first.").
103. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b).
104. Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 751.
105. Id.
106. Id.
(citing Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S.Ct. 817, 824-26 (2013); Henderson ex
rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1202-06 (2011); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S.
154, 160-66 (2010)).
107. Id.(citing Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979)).
108. Id.(citing Sebelius, 133 S.Ct. at 824-25 (listing cases)); see also Shinseki, 131 S.Ct. at 1203
("Filing deadlines, such as the 120-day filing deadline at issue here, are quintessential claim-processing
rules."); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510-16 (2006); Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12
(2005); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452-56 (2004).
109. Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 752 (quoting Miller v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 738
F.3d 836, 844 (7th Cir. 2013)).
110. Id.
at 753 54.
111. Id.
112. Id.at 751; see Natural Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 666 F.2d 595, 602
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
113. NaturalRes. Def Council, 666 F.2d at 602; see Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 751.
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"the reliance interests of regulatees who conform their conduct to the regula1
tions.", 14
The Clean Water Action Council court, however, rejected this reasoning as
a basis for finding filing deadlines jurisdictional. 1 15 This reasoning, in the
court's view, simply explained why it makes sense to have filing deadlines, but
not why such deadlines should be viewed as jurisdictional. 1 6 It agreed that filing deadlines serve "valuable functions," but asserted that the "beneficiaries" of
such deadlines were capable of enforcing their rights. 117 Thus, there was no
need to categorize them as jurisdictional, thereby requiring the court to address
such deadlines first-even where the parties had waived or forfeited these protections. 118
Finally, the panel reasoned that Congress could have "framed the filing
and venue rules in jurisdictional terms, but it did not." 1 19 It noted that the provision does not use the word "jurisdiction" and, in its view, CAA section
307(b) does not contain language that "is traditionally understood as jurisdictional." Last, the court observed that the Supreme Court had not found the fil120
ing deadline in CAA section 307(b) to be jurisdictional.
3.

The Tenth Circuit'sDecision in Utah v. EPA

The Tenth Circuit in Utah v. EPA recently reached the opposite conclusion
12 1
when interpreting CAA section 307(b).
At issue in the case was Utah's submission of a SIP revision under the
CAA's regional haze program.12 2 Under the CAA, states must "prevent any future and remedy any existing man-made impairment of visibility" within their
state.123 EPA partially approved and partially disapproved the proposed revisions, which were published in the Federal Register on December 14, 2012.124
Though not required when publishing a final rule, the EPA normally reminds parties that they must file petitions for review within sixty days of the
publication and provides the corresponding deadline. 125 It did not do so here.

114. Natural Res. Def Council, 666 F.2d at 602; see Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 752.
115. Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 752.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Utah ex rel. Utah Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 750 F.3d 1182, 1184 (1Oth Cir. 2014).
122. Utah Dept of Envtl. Quality, 750 F.3d at 1184; Approval, Disapproval and Promulgation of
State Implementation Plans; State of Utah; Regional Haze Rule Requirements for Mandatory Class I
Areas under 40 CFR 51.309, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,355 (Dec. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 7492 (2012) (CAA section 169B -regional haze provisions).
123.
Utah Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 750 F.3d at 1184; 77 Fed. Reg. at 74,355.
124. Utah Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 750 F.3d at 1184; see also 77 Fed. Reg. at 74,355-56.
125. Utah Dep 't ofEnvtl. Quality, 750 F.3d at 1185 (stating that the EPA typically alerts interested
parties to the sixty-day deadline).
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The EPA tried to correct the omission by publishing another statement in the
Federal Register on January 22, 2013, extending the filing deadline for an extra
month to March 25, 2013.126 Following EPA's guidance, Utah and PacifiCorp
(an affected company) filed petitions for review in the Tenth Circuit in midMarch 2013.127
The court first noted that under CAA section 307(b) a petition for review
must be filed within sixty days of the date that EPA's action is published in the
Federal Register. 128 It then made clear that the "deadline is jurisdictional," citing the D.C. Circuit in Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality v.
EPA. 129 Looking only to the EPA's initial publication date of December 14,
2012 and the petitioners' filing date in mid-March 2013, the court declared that
"the petitions would ordinarily be considered untimely."' 130 Nevertheless, it
proceeded to address the parties' arguments in support of jurisdiction.131
First, the court considered whether the sixty-day deadline was excused
under CAA section 307(b)(1), which permits late filings for petitions "based
solely on grounds arising" after sixty days. 132 The court rejected the argument
because the legal basis for the petitioners' claims (i.e., the "grounds" for the petitions)-the EPA action-was published on December 14, 2012.
Second, the court addressed whether the EPA's later correction in the Federal Register had changed the publication date from December 14, 2012 to January 22, 2013.133 Using this date, petitioners argued that the filings were timely. 134 Petitioners pointed to an EPA regulation that instructed parties to use the
date of publication in the Federal Register "[u]nless the Administrator other135
wise explicitly provides in a particular promulgation, approval, or action."'
They argued that by issuing the corrected notice, EPA had explicitly changed
the promulgation date. The court, however, rejected this argument as a matter
of law. 136 It noted that EPA had never explicitly stated that it was changing the
promulgation date; rather, EPA merely purported to restart the sixty-day deadline by specifying a new deadline for judicial review on March 25, 2013.131

126. Id.; see Approval, Disapproval and Promulgation of State Implementation Plans; State of
Utah; Regional Haze Rule Requirements for Mandatory Class I Areas under 40 CFR 51.309, 78 Fed.
Reg. 4341-01 (corrected Jan. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
127. Utah Dep 't ofEnvtl. Quality, 750 F.3d at 1184; see also 77 Fed. Reg. at 74,355-56.
128. Utah Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 750 F.3d at 1184 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012)).
129. Id. (citing Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 740 F.3d 185, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id
133. Id. at 1185; see Approval, Disapproval and Promulgation of State Implementation Plans;
State of Utah; Regional Haze Rule Requirements for Mandatory Class I Areas under 40 CFR 51.309, 78
Fed. Reg. 4341-01 (corrected Jan. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
134. Utah Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 750 F.3d at 1184.
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
137. Id. at 1185; see 78 Fed. Reg. at 4341.
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Third, the court considered whether to apply the "reopener doctrine," first
used by the D.C. Circuit to allow judicial review when an agency had "either
explicitly or implicitly-undertaken to 'reexamine its former choice." ' 138 The
court observed that the Tenth Circuit had not yet adopted the doctrine and
nonetheless decided that the doctrine would not apply. 139 The court held that
though the EPA's corrected notice had purported to extend the filing deadline,
the EPA had not indicated that it would reexamine its rejection of the Utah
40
plan. 1
Fourth and finally, the court made short work of the parties' argument that
it would be inequitable to dismiss the petitions. 14 1 Although the court recognized the inequities in light of EPA's corrected statement, the court believed
that it was constrained; it simply could not expand its jurisdiction to avoid
hardships. 142

Following the Tenth Circuit's order on May 6, 2014, the Utah panel denied rehearing on September 3, 2014.143 In that opinion, the panel expanded
and refined the rationale for its conclusion that the filing deadline rule was jurisdictional. 144 It therefore "adhere[d] to the conclusion stated in the panel
145
opinion: The deadline in § 7607(b)(1) is jurisdictional."'
The panel noted that filing deadlines can either be jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional. 146 In order to decide, the court looked to a "bright-line" rule that
"focuses on Congress's stated intention."' 147 Naturally, where Congress has
clearly stated that a filing deadline is jurisdictional, the courts give effect to that
intent. 148 But this intention, the panel found, can be demonstrated without the
use of specific words. 14 9 Rather, the conclusion on whether Congress has been
"clear" necessitates an analysis of the "legal character of the deadline, as shown
through its text, context, and historical treatment."' 50 Applying this framework
to CAA section 307(b)(1)'s text, context, and historical treatment, the court explored whether the sixty-day filing deadline was jurisdictional.' 51

138. Utah Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 750 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of
Interior, 70 F.3d 1345, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Pub. Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 901
F.2d 147, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
139. Id.at 1185-86.
140. Id. at 1186.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213-14 (2007)).
143. See Utah v. EPA, 765 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2014) (denying panel rehearing).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1258.
146. Id
147. Id. (citing Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013)).
148. Id at 1257.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1258 ("[L]ooking to the condition's text, context, and relevant historical treatment."
(citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 (2010))).
151. See id at 1257-64.
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The panel proceeded to analyze the statutory text of CAA section
307(b)(1), as well as its legislative history, concluding that the text suggested
that Congress intended the provision to be jurisdictional. 15 2 It next looked at
the context of the entire provision in the statutory scheme. 153 Because the section serves as a jurisdictional basis for courts, the panel found that it similarly
supported its view that the filing deadline was jurisdictional. 154 The court then
surveyed the historical treatment of the provision, including distinguishing recent Supreme Court cases that the parties argued had "overhauled" the histori155
cal treatment of filing deadlines as jurisdictional in nature.
The court also addressed other arguments presented by the petitions for
rehearing by Utah and PacifiCorp. 15 6 It first rejected Utah's argument that because EPA had subsequently informed the public that the petition for review
could be filed by March 25, 2013, EPA's reference to that date "bears a presumption of regularity.' 157 The court, however, found that even if that were
true, EPA did not effectuate a change in the filing deadline through its publica1 58
tion of that date in its corrected notice.
Second, the court addressed a new argument by the parties that EPA had
explicitly changed the date of the notice of its regulatory "action"- another
ambiguous term found in EPA's regulation establishing the publication in the
Federal Register as the starting point for calculating a deadline. 159 But the panel found that this claim was merely a variation of the parties' previous argument that EPA had explicitly changed the "promulgation" date through its correction notice on January 22, 2013.160
Third, the panel addressed the parties' related argument that EPA acted
"explicitly" in setting the new deadline for filing petitions for review. 16 1 The
court reasoned that, even if true, it would not provide a basis for finding that
EPA could change the filing deadline. 162 The regulation relied on by the parties
required EPA to explicitly change the notice date of its "promulgation" or "ac-

152. See id. at 1258-61 (reviewing statutory and legislative history of CAA section 307(b)).
153. Id. at 1260.
154. Id. (citing other Tenth Circuit panel decisions where the court stated it had jurisdiction under
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)) ("Without § 7607(b)(1), we would lack jurisdiction because the federal government would have enjoyed sovereign immunity in suits against the EPA.").
155. Id. at 1261 (distinguishing Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011),
from Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013), which had held that the filing deadlines
in question were not jurisdictional).
156. Id. at 1262-63.
157. Id. at 1263.
158. Id. at 1262-63.
159. Id. at 1263 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 23.3 (2014)) ("[The EPA's] 'promulgation, approval, or action' is ordinarily considered filed when published in the Federal Register, but not when the EPA explicitly provides otherwise.").
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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tion."' 163 Thus EPA's explicit attempt to change thefiling deadline did not conform to the regulation's requirement that EPA explicitly change the notice date
of its promulgation or action.164 Last, it quickly rejected two arguments that
the parties had raised previously. 165 The panel noted that the parties had not
challenged the panel's original rationale and therefore adhered to its original
finding that deference to EPA's interpretation of its regulation was not applica66
ble and that the "reopener" doctrine would not apply.1
4.

The D.C. Circuit's Opinions Analyzing Section 307(b)(1)

Because CAA section 307(b)(1) requires parties to file petitions for review
in the D.C. Circuit for challenges to CAA final rules and actions of nationwide
scope, the D.C. Circuit has had much more of an opportunity to hear petitions
under section 307(b)(1) than other circuits. 167 But as Judge Easterbrook observed in Clean Water Action Council of Northeastern Wisconsin, Inc. v. EPA,
many of these cases simply rely on past precedent without analyzing the precise
issue presented here. 168 For example, in 2014, the D.C. Circuit in Oklahoma
Department of Environmental Quality v. EPA first recited the requirement in
CAA section 307(b) that "[a] petition for review of a final rule issued pursuant
to the Clean Air Act must be filed within 60 days of the publication of that rule
in the Federal Register."' 169 Then, quoting Medical Waste Institute v. EPA, a
2011 D.C. Circuit case, it stated that this requirement was "jurisdictional in na170
ture," with no further elaboration.
In turn, in Medical Waste Institute v. EPA, the court declined to reach the
merits of one of petitioner's challenges to an EPA regulation concerning certain
waste incinerators.171 The court held that the claim was barred by CAA section
307(b)(1) because the "filing period" in the CAA "is jurisdictional in nature."' 172 Thus, it found it was powerless to review the claim. 173 It simply cited
the 1998 D.C. Circuit case Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Ass 'n v. Nich74
ols, without further elaboration. 1

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1264.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Utah ex rel. Utah Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 750 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir.
2014); Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 740 F.3d 185, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Med. Waste Inst. v.
EPA, 645 F.3d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 45960 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
168. See Clean Water Action Council of Ne. Wis. v. EPA, 765 F.3d 749, 751-52 (7th Cir. 2014).
169. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 191 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012)).
170. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 191 (quoting Med. Waste Inst., 645 F.3d at 427);
see 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
171. Med. Waste Inst., 645 F.3d at 427.
172. Id. (quoting Nichols, 142 F.3d at 460).
173. Id.
174. Id.; Nichols, 142 F.3d at 460.

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 42:37

Next in the chain was Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Ass 'n v. Nichols, where the D.C. Circuit reviewed EPA's actions with respect to California's
automobile on-board emissions diagnostic device regulations, which were
promulgated pursuant to California's authority under the CAA. 175 When addressing EPA's argument that some of the petitioners' challenges were untimely, the court parroted the familiar quote that the filing deadline in CAA section
307(b)(1) is "jurisdictional in nature, and may not be enlarged or altered by the
courts." 176 But yet again the court merely quoted to earlier decisions of panels
177
in the D.C. Circuit to support its holding.
One case that was cited by the court in Motor & Equipment Manufacturers
Ass'n v. Nichols involved a petition for review filed under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-not the CAA. 178 In Edison Electric Institute v.
EPA, the D.C. Circuit reviewed whether a challenge to an EPA statement concerning its enforcement policy of a particular Recovery Act provision was
timely.1 79 In that case, the court categorically found that filing periods, such as
the Recovery Act's ninety-day filing window, were "jurisdictional in nature,
and may not be enlarged or altered by the courts." 180 And like the aforementioned cases, it cited to an even older case to support its holding. 181
Finally, at the end of the line, was the D.C. Circuit's 1981 decision in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, where the
court addressed a challenge subject to review under section 2344 of the Hobbs
Act.' 82 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission argued that the Natural Resources
Defense Council's claim was untimely. 183 The Natural Resources Defense
Council argued that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission erred when it promulgated certain amendments to its regulations without following notice and comment procedures.1 84 In ruling that the petition was untimely, the court concluded that the deadline "for seeking judicial review set forth in the Hobbs Act is
jurisdictional in nature, and may not be enlarged or altered by the courts." 185
The D.C. Circuit explained that: "This time limit, like other similar limitations, serves the important purpose of imparting finality into the administrative
process, thereby conserving administrative resources and protecting the reli-

175. Nichols, 142 F.3d at 452.
176. Id. at 460 (quoting Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
177. Id.
178. Edison Elec. Inst., 996 F.2d at 331.
179. Id. at 330-31; see Policy on Enforcement of RCRA Section 3004(J) Storage Prohibition at
Facilities Generating Mixed Radioactive/Hazardous Wastes, 56 Fed. Reg. 42,730-01 (Aug. 29, 1991).
180. Edison Elec. Inst., 996 F.2d at 331.
181. Id.
182. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 666 F.2d 595, 601 (D.C. Cir.
1981); see 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (2012).
183. NaturalRes. Def Council, 666 F.2d at 601.
184. Idat600-0I.
185. Id.
at 602.
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186
ance interests of regulatees who conform their conduct to the regulations."'
Thus, these reasons supported the court's finding that filing deadlines are jurisdictional. 187 But this case was not a CAA case, so the court did not reach its
conclusion with respect to section 307(b)(1).
Beyond this line of cases, the D.C. Circuit has cited section 307(b)(1) a
number of other times. In many of these cases, it has suggested without analysis that 307(b)(1) is a jurisdictional provision. 188 But it has also characterized
section 307(b)(1) as containing venue rules. For example, in American Road &
Transportation Builders Ass'n v. EPA, the court explained that section
307(b)(1) "establishes two routes by which venue may be appropriate in [the
D.C. Circuit]. First, EPA's regulations may themselves be nationally applicable. Second, and alternatively, EPA may determine that the otherwise locally or
regionally applicable regulations have a nationwide scope or effect."' 8 9 Based
on its finding that "venue is proper in the Ninth Circuit and not in [the D.C.
190
Circuit]," the court dismissed the petition for review.
Likewise, the court in Texas Municipal Power Agency v. EPA concluded
that section 307(b)(1) "is a matter of venue, not jurisdiction; [and] since EPA
raised no objection, the provision is no bar to . . . review." 19 1 It found that the
provision prescribes "the choice among circuits and not the power of a particular federal circuit court to hear a claim." 1 92 The court found support "by the
provision's reference to where a petitioner may 'file,' and by its unequivocal
characterization in the legislative history as a venue provision."' 193 It concluded
that section 307(b)(1) "refers to where a petitioner must file, and that the apparent congressional purpose was to place nationally significant decisions in the
D.C. Circuit." 194 And "[g]iven the less than clear language, the structure of the

186. Id.
187. See also Envtl. Def. v. EPA, 467 F.3d 1329, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("We do not have jurisdiction to review petitioners' challenge to this set of regulations because the statutory period for judicial
review has long since passed."); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
("[Congress's intent] in this jurisdictional enactment was clearly to compel timely petitions for review.").
188. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 777 F.3d 456, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("We have
jurisdiction to hear the petition under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)."); Nat'l Envtl. Dev. Ass'n's Clean Air
Project v. EPA, 686 F.3d 803, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("We have jurisdiction to consider this challenge
under CAA Section 307(b)(1), which provides that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over petitions
for review of national ambient air quality standards promulgated by the EPA Administrator."); Natural
Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 643 F.3d 311, 317 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that petitioner had filed a petition
for review pursuant to section 307(b)(1), "which gives this court exclusive jurisdiction over challenges
to final EPA actions"); Sierra Club v. EPA, 356 F.3d 296, 300 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that "Sierra
Club now petitions for review of both actions pursuant to the jurisdictional grant of 42 U.S.C. §
7607(b)(1)"), amendedby No. 03-1084, 2004 WL 877850 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 16, 2004).
189. Am. Rd. & Transp. Builders Ass'n v. EPA, 705 F.3d 453,455 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
190. Id. at 456.
191. 89 F.3d 858, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
192. Id. at 867.
193. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 323-24 (1977)).
194. Id.
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section-dividing cases among the circuits-and the legislative history indicate
that § 307(b)(1) is framed more as a venue provision."' 195 Because of EPA's
failure to object, the court deemed the provision's venue waived and found that
19 6
the petitions for review were proper in the D.C. Circuit.
III.

ANALYSIS OF CLEAN AIR ACT SECTION

307(b)(1)'s

FILING DEADLINE

AND VENUE RULES

A.

Introduction

With this doctrinal, statutory, and case law background in mind, this Part
assesses whether CAA section 307(b)'s filing deadline and venue requirements
are jurisdictional.
First, though the Supreme Court has not definitively held, CAA case law
indicates that section 307(b)(1) provides the basis for the courts of appeals'
subject-matter jurisdiction. As such, the Supreme Court might very well find
that the venue rules and filing deadline within that provision should similarly
be construed as jurisdictional limits. The Court's views on this issue, however,
have been merely "drive by" jurisdictional rulings. In light of the Court's renewed interest in clarifying whether rules are jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional, these past rulings are far from conclusive.
Second, the courts of appeals are split on whether the rules within section
307(b) are jurisdictional. Although the D.C. Circuit should theoretically offer
comprehensive and definitive views, its decisions have been less than clear. A
survey of its cases suggests that the D.C. Circuit holds a categorical view that
all filing deadlines are jurisdictional. 197 This sweeping view, however, is at
odds with recent Supreme Court guidance. In that respect, the very recent analyses by the Tenth and Seventh Circuits may offer the most insight into how the
courts of appeals should approach these pivotal inquiries.
Third, very recent cases by the Supreme Court have provided a consistent
test for analyzing this issue. This test, as set forth below, asks if Congress has
spoken clearly as to whether a particular rule is jurisdictional or not. After applying this test and framework, this Article concludes that although the filing
deadline is jurisdictional, the venue rule directing some petitions for review to
the D.C. Circuit and other petitions to the "local" circuit courts of appeals is not
jurisdictional. The goals and structure of the CAA, canons of statutory construction, bedrock civil procedure and administrative law principles, as well as
sovereign immunity and core Article III concerns, all support these conclusions.

195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating that filing
deadlines, in general, are "jurisdictional in nature, and may not be enlarged or altered by the courts" (citation omitted)); see also supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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B.

The Supreme Court's Framework

The Supreme Court in the recent case EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. analyzed whether a different subsection of CAA section 307 implicated the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts.1 98 As a threshold issue, EPA
argued that the petitioners had not raised their objections to a CAA regulation
during the public comment period with "reasonable specificity."' 199 Relying on
this statutory requirement found in CAA section 307(d), EPA asserted that the
lower court therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain those arguments. 200 The
Court, however, found that even if petitioners had not met this requirement for
judicial review, it would not "regard that lapse as 'jurisdictional." '' 2 1 It concluded with little elaboration that the requirement did not "speak to a court's
20 2
authority" and only spoke to "a party's procedural obligations."
The holding was consistent with the Court's recent apprehension regarding the use of the term "jurisdictional." For example, in 2004, the Court in Kontrick v. Ryan declared that "[c]larity would be facilitated if courts and litigants
used the label 'jurisdictional' not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the
persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory authority. ' '20 3 Two years later, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., the Court decried that the
word jurisdiction "is a word of many, too many, meanings." 20 4 It quipped that
the "Court, no less than other courts, has sometimes been profligate in its use of
the term." 20 5 Subsequent decisions further clarified that a rule may be "manda20 6
tory," yet not "jurisdictional.
Thus, in order to determine whether a rule should be regarded as jurisdictional, the Court has developed a "readily administrable bright line" to assess
whether to categorize a statutory limitation as jurisdictional. 20 7 Unless such
clarity is present, the Court has directed courts to construe the requirement as
non-jurisdictional in nature. 20 8 But the Court has warned that Congress need
not "incant magic words in order to speak clearly." 20 9 Rather, courts are required to determine whether Congress intended a particular requirement to be

198.
199.

EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1602-03 (2014).
Id. at 1602.

200.

Id.

201. Id.
202. Id. at 1602-03 (citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)).
540 U.S. at 455.
203.
204. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998)).
205. Id.
206.
207.
at 516).
208.

(2012).
209.

EME Homer City, 134 S. Ct. at 1602-03 (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510).
Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013) (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S.
Id. (citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648-49

Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824.
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jurisdictional. 21 ° To do this in the absence of specific language, courts should
analyze the legal character of a requirement, "as shown through its text, con21
text, and historical treatment. I
In other words, after analyzing the language of the provision in question,
including its legislative history, courts should look to how the provision operates in the overall statutory scheme, as well as the "Court's interpretations of
similar provisions in many years past." 2 12 This framework is therefore designed
"to capture Congress' likely intent and also provides helpful guidance for
2 13
courts and litigants" to ascertain whether a rule is jurisdictional.
Here, the test therefore requires an analysis of the text and history of CAA
section 307(b)(1), the context of this provision within the overall goals and
structure of the CAA, and the Supreme Court's past treatment of filing deadlines and venue rules with respect to whether they are jurisdictional.
C. PlainLanguage of Clean Air Act Section 307
Like any exercise in statutory construction, the starting place to divine
congressional intent is the text of the statute. 2 14 In order to determine whether
Congress intended the filing deadline and venues rules of section 307(b)(1) to
be jurisdictional, the analysis begins with the plain language of section 307.
Clearly, Congress did not explicitly label section 307 as a jurisdictional provision or indicate that the provision invoked the court's "jurisdiction" or was "jurisdictional. '2 15 Indeed, the section is titled "Administrative proceedings and
2 16
judicial review," and subsection (b) is titled "Judicial Review."
This language stands in stark contrast to other provisions where Congress
has called a provision "jurisdictional" or has used explicit language concerning
jurisdiction. For example, Part IV of Title 28 of the United States Code
(U.S.C.) covers "Jurisdiction and Venue." 2 17 Likewise, Chapter 85 of Part IV is
titled "District Courts; Jurisdiction." 2 18 Congress has also labeled specific provisions as being jurisdictional in nature. For instance, 28 U.S.C. § 1295 is

210. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011) ("[W]e attempt to
ascertain Congress' intent regarding the particular type of review at issue in this case.").
211.
Utah v. EPA, 765 F.3d 1257, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 2014) ("[L]ooking to the condition's text,
context, and relevant historical treatment." (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166
(2010))).
212. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824 (citing Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 168); see also John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34 (2008).
213. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. at 1203 (citingArbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514-15 & n. 11).
214. See Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330 (1978) ("[T]he starting
point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself." (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977))).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2012).
216. Id.
217. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1631 (2012) (Part IV).
218. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1369 (2012) (Chapter 85 of Part IV, titled "District Courts; Jurisdiction").
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named "Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir2 19
cuit."
Moreover, within the U.S.C. chapter addressing the courts of appeals,
Congress used explicit language addressing jurisdiction. 220 For instance, 28
U.S.C. § 1291 states that the courts of appeals (other than the Federal Circuit)
"shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions" of the district courts
(with limited exceptions). 22 1 Furthermore, the provision also specifies that the
"jurisdiction of the United States Court of the Appeals for the Federal Circuit
shall be limited to the jurisdiction" addressed in certain other sections within
that chapter. 222 The various U.S.C. provisions addressing district courts are
even clearer. 2 23 Virtually every provision states that "[t]he district courts shall
224
have original jurisdiction" and specifies the parameters of such jurisdiction.
In sum, as a threshold matter, Congress's denomination of section 307(b)
as a judicial review provision, rather than a provision defining the courts' jurisdiction, suggests that it did not intend the requirements of such section to be jurisdictional. But this conclusion does not end the inquiry. Even without using
the "magic words" that CAA section 307 is a jurisdictional provision, it is still
necessary to analyze the specific language that Congress used in the filing
deadline and venue requirements in section 307(b)(1). 225 Based on this analysis, and as supported by the context and historical treatment of section 307,
Congress clearly intended the filing deadline and venue requirement that directs
petitions for review to the courts of appeals to be jurisdictional, but the "choice
of circuit" rule not to be jurisdictional.
D. FilingDeadline Requirement in Section 307(b)(1)
Based on the text and context of section 307(b)(1), as well as the historical
treatment of filing deadline provisions similar to section 307(b)(1), Congress
clearly intended section 307(b)(1)'s filing deadline requirement to be jurisdictional.
1.

The Text of the Filing DeadlineRequirement in Section 307(b)(1)

Section 307(b)(1)'s filing deadline requirement states petitions for review
under the subsection "shall be filed within sixty days from the date" that the
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1295; see also § 1251 (Original Jurisdiction) (defining the matters over which the
Supreme Court "shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction").
220. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1296 (Chapter 83 of Part IV).
221. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Final Decisions of District Courts).
222. Id.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2012).
224. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1369 (Chapter 84 of Part IV); see, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (Federal Question), 1332 (Diversity of Citizenship), 1333 (Admiralty, Maritime and Prize Cases), 1335 (Interpleader),
1337 (Commerce and Antitrust Regulations), 1338 (Patent), 1339 (Postal Matters), 1340 (Internal Revenue); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 1346, 1350 (discussing jurisdictional requirements).
225. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S.Ct. 817, 824 (2013).
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agency action is published in the Federal Register. 226 The section also allows
an extension beyond that deadline when a petition "is based solely on grounds
arising after such sixtieth day, then any petition for review under this subsec2 27
tion shall be filed within sixty days after such grounds arise."
Congress used jurisdictional terminology in the filing deadline requirement, such as "shall" and "petition for review." 228 These words have been regarded by the Supreme Court as carrying "jurisdictional import. '229 An example of this type of wording is found in Part 83 of Title 28 of the U.S.C., which
sets forth various jurisdictional provisions applicable to the courts of appeals. 2 30 Congress provided that "the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall have jurisdiction over a petition for review of a final decision" of certain agencies and required that a "petition for review under this section must be filed within 30 days after the date the petitioner receives notice of
23 1
the final decision."
But to assess whether the usage of these words in section 307(b) demonstrates Congress's intent to make them jurisdictional requires a specific analysis
of the enactment and subsequent amendments of that section. This analysis
suggests that Congress did indeed intend the filing deadline in section
307(b)(1) to be jurisdictional.
The filing deadline requirement originated in the Senate version of the
CAA and first appeared as a thirty-day deadline in 1970.232 A 1970 Senate Report by the Committee on Public Works, which proposed the amendments,
supports the view that Congress wanted the deadline to be jurisdictional. In establishing a Judicial Review section, the committee identified that the "availability or opportunity for judicial review of administratively developed and
promulgated standards and regulations" was "[o]ne of the uncertainties in the
existing Clean Air Act."' 233 Furthermore, the committee was unclear the effect
that such a judicial review would have on the "general program" of the
CAA.

2 34

The committee was concerned that "even in matters committed by statute
to administrative discretion, preclusion of judicial review" requires clear congressional intent. 235 The committee concluded that "precluding review does not
appear to be warranted or desirable," but that such review should be maintained

226. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
227. Id.
228. Utah v. EPA, 765 F.3d 1257, 1259 (1Oth Cir. 2014).
229. Id. (citing Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 825-26). In the Tenth Circuit's view, Congress used this
language because it intended the filing deadline to be jurisdictional. Id.
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1296 (2012).
231. Id.
(emphasis added).
232. See Utah, 765 F.3d at 1259; see also Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654,
660 (D.C.Cir. 1975) (discussing section 307).
233. S.REP. No. 91-1196, at 40 (1970).
234. Id.
235. Id.at40-41.
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"within controlled time periods." 236 Therefore, it made clear: "In order to maintain the integrity of the time sequences provided throughout the Act, the bill
would provide that any review sought must be filed within 30 days of the date
of the challenged promulgation or approval. ' 237 The mandatory language used
by the committee that petitions "must be filed" to ensure the time sequence of
the CAA demonstrates that Congress intended the timing deadline to be jurisdictional.
Furthermore, the committee wanted to ensure that the filing of a petition
for judicial review did "not operate as a stay of the application of the promulgation or decision for which review is sought unless the party seeking such review is able to demonstrate to the court that there is substantial likelihood that
such party will prevail on the merits and that interests of the public will not be
harmed by such stay." 238 This further underscores Congress's jurisdictional intent, because Congress wanted all challenges to occur immediately so as not to
delay the finality of the EPA regulation or final action.
When Congress proposed amendments to the CAA in the early to mid1970s, it also expressed concerns that courts had recently suggested that filing
deadlines found in statutory provisions similar to section 307(b) could be excused in certain circumstances. 2 39 The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce cited the then-recent decision of Investment Co. Institute v.
Board of Governors, where a panel of the D.C. Circuit, in dicta, suggested that
if a party had "a legitimate excuse for not having brought his challenge within
30 days," such party should not necessarily be precluded from bringing a
case. 240 In the committee's view, "an undefined legitimate excuse" could allow
"the statutory deadline (and the underlying policies of expedition and finality)"
24 1
to be circumvented.
Although Congress ultimately expanded the time for petitions for review
to be filed from thirty days to sixty days in the CAA Amendments of 1977, the
committee repeated both its continued concern for strict adherence to the filing
deadline and also explicitly stated that the filing deadline was jurisdictional:

236. Id.at41.
237. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing S. REP. NO. 911196, at 41).
238. S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 41. The current version of section 307(b)(I) retains this language.
The final sentence of the section makes clear that the filing of a petition for reconsideration of a rule or
action with the EPA does not (1)affect the finality of the rule or action for purposes of judicial review;
(2) extend the filing deadline for a petition for review in the courts of appeals; nor (3) postpone the effectiveness of the rule or action in question. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012).
239. H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 322 (1977); see also Utah v. EPA, 765 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir.
2014) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 322).
240. Inv. Co. Inst. v. Bd. of Governors, 551 F.2d 1270, 1281-82 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (dicta); H.R.
REP. No. 95-294, at 322.
241. H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 322; see also Utah, 765 F.3d at 1259 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95294, at 322).
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[T]he committee wishes to reaffirm its intent to strictly limit
section 307 challenges to those which are actually filed within
that time. The only instance in which the committee intends
that later challenges may be entertained by the court of appeals are those in which the grounds arise solely after the 60th
24 2
day.
The committee made clear:
Thus, unless a petitioner can show that the basis for his challenge did not exist or was not reasonably to be anticipated before the expiration of 60 days, the court of appeals is without
jurisdiction to consider a petition filed later than 60 days after
the publication of the promulgated rule. The committee deems
243
60 days a legally adequate opportunity for judicial review.
Congress's express desire to prevent courts from applying a "good cause"
exception (beyond what was specifically provided for in the statute, i.e., new
information) further supports that the section 307(b)(1) filing deadline is juris244
dictional and thus not alterable by the courts.
In sum, the text of section 307(b)(1) and its legislative history show that
Congress intended to "strictly limit" judicial review to petitions filed within
sixty days. The language of the legislative history, coupled with Congress's use
of the word "shall" file a "petition for review," demonstrates that Congress
clearly intended the filing deadline to be jurisdictional.
2.

The Context of the FilingDeadline Requirement

The context of the filing deadline within the structure of the CAA, as well
as related sovereign immunity principles, further reinforces the conclusion that
Congress intended the filing deadline to be jurisdictional. Section 307(b)(1)
provides the basis for jurisdiction in these types of challenges. Petitioners and
the courts, including the Supreme Court, consistently identify the section as jurisdictional. 2 45 Without section 307(b)(1) or a similar provision authorizing review of EPA action, courts could not entertain such lawsuits because EPA en24 6
joys sovereign immunity.

242. Utah, 765 F.3d at 1259-60 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 322).
243. Id.
244. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012) (allowing an untimely petition "if such petition is based solely
on grounds arising after such sixtieth day").
245.
Utah, 765 F.3d at 1260 n.1 ("In their opening briefs, PacifiCorp and Utah cited § 7607(b)(1)
as a basis for jurisdiction."); Oklahoma v. EPA, 723 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 2013) (affirming the
court's jurisdiction under section 7607(b)(1)); Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 562 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th
Cir. 2009) (same); see also Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 593 (1980) ("Congress ... vested the courts of appeals with jurisdiction under [42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)] .... ").
246. Utah, 765 F.3d at 1260 ("Suits against the EPA, as against any agency of the United States,
are barred by sovereign immunity, unless there has been a specific waiver of that immunity." (citing
Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2001))); see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer,
510 U.S. 471,475 (1994) (stating that sovereign immunity shields federal agencies from suit).
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In general, federal courts "may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory
basis" and "the United States is not amenable to suit in the federal courts absent
an express waiver of sovereign immunity." 24 7 And because "[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature," if "it has not been waived, sovereign immunity shields the federal govemment, its agencies, and federal officials acting
248
in their official capacities from suit."
Here, however, Congress specifically authorized challenges in section
307(b)(1). 249 When viewed in this light, section 307(b)(1) therefore constitutes
a waiver of sovereign immunity. 250 By extension, Congress's establishment of
a sixty-day window to file a petition for review constitutes a specific limitation
on that waiver, and accordingly strict adherence to such deadline is also jurisdictional. 25 1 Courts have found that this is especially true where a particular restriction is "connected" to the grant of jurisdiction rather than "set off' from
it. 2 52
The interpretation that Congress intended section 307(b)(1)'s filing deadline to be jurisdictional based on its sovereign immunity implications dovetails
with Congress's concern for how section 307(b)(1) should operate with respect
to the overall structure of the CAA. As discussed above, when Congress enacted the original version of section 307(b)(1), it wanted judicial review to be
open only for a short time period "[i]n order to maintain the integrity of the
253
time sequences provided throughout the Act."
In the original CAA, Congress established many aggressive and ambitious
sequential deadlines. For example, in the 1970 Amendments, Congress charged
EPA with the responsibility of establishing NAAQS for various air pollutants. 254 After establishing NAAQS, EPA is required to promulgate designations of geographic areas across the nation according to their compliance with
the NAAQS. 255 Similarly, CAA section 112 requires EPA to designate pollutants "which present, or may present, through inhalation or other routes of exposure, a threat of adverse human health effects" as "hazardous air pollu-

247.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005); United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); see Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 934 F. Supp. 2d 40, 45 (D.D.C.

2013).
248.
Friends of the Earth, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 45 (quoting Meyer, 5 10 U.S. at 475), 46 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985) (suing federal officials in their official capacities)).
249.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) ("Congress has moreover authorized this
type of challenge to EPA action. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).").
250.
Utah, 765 F.3d at 1260 ("Congress waived sovereign immunity through § 7607(b)(1).").
251.
Id. ("This jurisdictional junction suggests that the 60-day deadline is itselfjurisdictional.").
252.
Id. at 1261 n.4 ("Contextually, the placement of a restriction within a statute is important. If
the restriction is connected to a grant of jurisdiction, then the restriction is likely meant to qualify that
grant; but if the restriction is 'set off' from the grant of jurisdiction, it may be non jurisdictional [sic]."
(quoting United States v. McGaughy, 670 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2012))).
253.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing S. REP. NO. 911196, at41 (1970)).
254.
42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012).
255.
§ 7407.
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tants." 256 The EPA administrator was then required to promulgate standards for
2 57
these pollutants.
Thus, unlike cases where courts have found that leniency in a filing deadline is necessary to address a remedial purpose, 258 such as in a case involving
civil rights, strict adherence to the CAA filing deadline is both necessary and in
the public interest to ensure that air pollution standards go into effect as soon as
possible. 25 9 The Seventh Circuit identified this concern when addressing a party's attempt to file a challenge in the district courts under a different CAA provision: the court found that "[s]uch a collateral attack would evade the time period for reviewing the attainment date and cannot be countenanced. '260 The
court explained that the filing deadline "is not arbitrary but is designed to get
26 1
issues resolved promptly and thereby prevent delay in cleaning the air."
Relatedly, if the filing deadline were construed to be non-jurisdictional,
judicial review could be extended using equitable tolling principles or for good
cause. This could result in air pollution programs being delayed past the standard period for seeking review, which could trigger a domino effect of delays
through the rest of the steps or stages of the program at issue. Although Congress did provide that petitions could be filed beyond sixty days, it did so because it felt that it was important that regulations always take into account the
latest information:
The committee recognizes that it would not be in the public
interest to measure for all time the adequacy of a promulgation of any standard or regulation by the information available
at the time of such promulgation. In the area of protection of
public health and environmental quality, it is clear that new information will be developed and that such information may
dictate a revision or modification of any promulgated standard
or regulation established under the act. The judicial review
section, therefore, provides that any person may challenge any
promulgated implementation plan after the date of promulgation whenever it is alleged that significant new information
2 62
has become available.

256. See § 7412.
257. See id.
258. See, e.g., Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990) (addressing equitable tolling
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986) (addressing
equitable tolling under the Social Security Act); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 39293 (1982) (addressing equitable tolling under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
259. Granite City Steel Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 925, 926 (7th Cir. 1974).
260. Id.
261.
Id.
262. Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoting S. REP.
No. 91-1196, at 41-42 (1970)); see also Utah v. EPA, 765 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing S.
REP. No. 91-1196, at 65-66) ("Congress recognized that if a petition was filed after 30 days, the court
could consider the matter only if 'significant new information [had] become available."').
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Although the conferees subsequently "tightened up the grounds" to qualify
under the exception in its present form, "solely on grounds arising after such
30th day," the point remains the same. 26 3 The administrative principle of finality is effectuated with an immutable filing deadline, but it is also in the public
interest to provide for a narrow extension where there is new information.
Thus, the context of section 307(b)(1) within the CAA demonstrates that Congress clearly intended the filing deadline to be jurisdictional.
3.

The HistoricalTreatment of Filing Deadlines

An examination of the historical treatment of similar filing deadlines
demonstrates that Congress clearly intended section 307(b)(1)'s deadline to be
jurisdictional. The Supreme Court "has long held that the taking of an appeal
within the prescribed time is 'mandatory and jurisdictional.' 2 6 4 Likewise, the
"courts of appeals routinely and uniformly dismiss untimely appeals for lack of
jurisdiction." 26 5 Treatises similarly note that it "is well settled that failure to file
266
a timely notice of appeal defeats the jurisdiction of a court of appeals."
Judicial review of administrative decisions has also been described as
"mandatory and jurisdictional" such as in a case involving "the deadline for
seeking review in the courts of appeals of final removal orders of the Board of
Immigration Appeals." 267 Likewise, courts "have uniformly held that the
Hobbs Act's 60-day time limit for filing a petition for review of certain final
agency decisions, 28 U.S.C. § 2344, is jurisdictional. '268
Recently, however, the Court rejected the categorical view that "every
deadline for seeking judicial review in civil litigation is jurisdictional. '2 69 It
clarified this conclusion in Bowles v. Russell, which "concerned an appeal from
one court to another court" where there had been a "century's worth of precedent and practice in American courts." 270 The Court has therefore distinguished

263.

Train, 515 F.2d at 660.

264. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-10 (2007) (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam)).
265. Id. at 210 ("[E]ven prior to the creation of the circuit courts of appeals, this Court regarded
statutory limitations on the timing of appeals as limitations on its own jurisdiction."); Scarborough v.
Pargoud, 108 U.S. 567, 568 (1883) ("[T]he writ of error in this case was not brought within the time
limited by law, and we have consequently no jurisdiction.").
266.

15A CHARLES WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER & EDWARD COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 3901 (2d ed. 1992).
267. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 (2011) (citing Stone v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 514 U.S. 386, 406 (1995) (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33,
45 (1990))).
268. Id. ("Government also notes that lower court decisions have uniformly held that the Hobbs
Act's 60-day time limit for filing a petition for review of certain final agency decisions, 28 U.S.C. §
2344, is jurisdictional.").
269. Id. at 1203.
270. Id. (quoting Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209-10); see also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm., 558 U.S. 67, 82 (2009) ("In contrast, relying on a long line of this
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filing deadlines in other scenarios. As another example, the Court recently
found that a deadline for appeals to the Court of Appeals for Veteran Claims
was not jurisdictional. 27 1 Likewise, the Court has "treated the rule-based time
limit for criminal cases differently, stating that it may be waived because '[t]he
procedural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its business
are not jurisdictional and can be relaxed by the Court in the exercise of its discretion."' 272 It also declined to find a "filing deadline in a statutory section allowing service providers to obtain a hearing in the Provider Reimbursement
Review Board" to be jurisdictional. 2 73 In yet another case, the Court found that
the timely filing of a U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge
was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a claim. 274 It found that Congress intended the filing period to operate as a statute of limitations instead of a
275
jurisdictional requirement.
Despite these rulings, however, the text and context of the provisions at issue in those cases differ significantly from section 307(b)(1). For example, the
differences have included: "the filing deadline was separated from the statutory
language conferring jurisdiction;" 2 76 the deadlines to appeal were "to an article
I court, not an article III court ' 277 and to an administrative board; 278 and "there
was no suggestion of a long-standing practice of treating filing deadlines as jurisdictional in appeals to [an article III court]. '2 79 All told, the text (and legislative history) of section 307(b), as well its context as a limited waiver of EPA's
sovereign immunity, show that Congress intended the filing deadline to be jurisdictional.
E. The Venue Rules in Section 307(b)(1)
A court's subject-matter jurisdiction over an action is generally distinct
from determining the proper venue in which an action could be filed.2 80 Subject-matter jurisdiction "addresses the power of the court to adjudicate," while
venue "addresses the place where that judicial authority may be exercised and
Court's decisions left undisturbed by Congress, we have reaffirmed the jurisdictional character of the
time limitation for filing a notice of appeal stated in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a).").
271. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. at 1204-05.
272. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 212 (citing Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 64 (1970)).
273. Utah v. EPA, 765 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 822).
274. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).
275. Id.
276. Utah, 765 F.3d at 1262 (citing Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. at 1205 (relying in part on Congress's
placement of the statutory language in a subchapter for "Procedure" rather than in the subsection for
"Organization and Jurisdiction")).
277. Id. (citing Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. at 1204-05) (noting that the appeal went to the Court of Appeals for Veteran Claims).
278. Id. (Reimbursement Review Board).
279. Id. (citing Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. at 1204-05).
280. See U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n v. ASAT, Inc., 411 F.3d 245, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939)); WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 266, § 3801.
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focuses on the convenience to the parties of the location of the lawsuit." '28 1 As
one court that interpreted section 307(b) noted: "[p]rovisions specifying where
a suit shall be filed, as distinct from specifying what kind of court or other tribunal it shall be filed in, are generally considered to be specifying venue rather
' 282
than jurisdiction."
But this does not mean that a venue rule within a provision cannot be jurisdictional in nature. "Congress is free to attach the conditions that go with the
jurisdictional label to a rule that [courts] would prefer to call a claim-processing
rule," such as a venue requirement. 283 Thus, the question remains whether
Congress intended a "venue" rule within a jurisdictional provision to be jurisdictional.
As set forth below, it is clear that section 307(b)(1) is jurisdictional with
respect to giving the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals
from agency action under 307(b)(1). It is well settled that the provision divested the district courts of jurisdiction over CAA petitions for review of agency
actions (through Congress's use of "any action" in that provision). 284 However,
an analysis of the text, context, and historical treatment of section 307(b)
demonstrates that the requirement that certain petitions must be filed in the
D.C. Circuit or in local circuit courts is non-jurisdictional. But in any event,
this distinction is blurred by a court's ability to transfer cases to the correct circuit court either by using their inherent authority or under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.285
1.

The Text of the Venue Rules in Section 307(b)(1)

Section 307(b)(1) establishes two distinct requirements as to the proper
court in which to challenge agency action that is subject to review under CAA
section 307(b). The text of the provision, as a whole, provides that the courts of
appeals are the sole fora for petitions for review of EPA final actions under section 307(b)(1). Next, the component parts of section 307(b)(1) allocate certain
petitions for review to the D.C. Circuit and others to the various "local" circuit
courts. The commitment of petitions for review to the courts of appeals, rather
than the district courts, is jurisdictional. The "choice of circuit" rule, however,
is not.
a.

The Venue Rule with Respect to the Exclusive Jurisdictionof the
Federal Courts of Appeals

It is clear that section 307(b)(1) prevents district courts from hearing actions covered by that section. In the 1980 case Harrison v. PPG Industries,

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

ASAT, Inc., 411 F.3d at 248 (citing Neirbo Co., 308 U.S. at 167-68).
New York v. EPA, 133 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 1998).
Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. at 1203 (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212-13 (2007)).
Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 584 (1980).
28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012).
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Inc., the Supreme Court found that in the 1977 CAA Amendments, Congress
had established the courts of appeals as the exclusive fora for filing petitions
for review of agency actions covered by section 307(b)(1). 2 86 In that case, the
Court was called upon "to determine what Congress intended when it vested
the courts of appeals with jurisdiction under § 307(b)(1) to review 'any other
287
final action. "'
Prior to the Court's decision there had been "conflicting views as to the
proper interpretation of § 307(b)(1). ' '288 Before the CAA Amendments of 1977,
section 307(b)(1) had established "exclusive review in an appropriate court of
appeals of certain locally or regionally applicable actions of the Administrator
under several specifically enumerated provisions of the Act." 2 89 Other actions
that had not been specified in that section were proper in federal district court
under federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.290
During its 1977 overhaul of the CAA, Congress expanded locally or regionally applicable actions that were reviewable in the courts of appeals. 29 1 It
added that "any other final action" was also reviewable by the courts of appeals
under section 307(b)(1). 292 The Court held that by adding such language, Congress demonstrated that it did not want district courts to maintain jurisdiction
previously proper using federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
133 1.293 The Court also concluded that as policy matter, granting jurisdiction
exclusively to the courts of appeals was "not wholly irrational. '294 Thus, there
is no real dispute that this part of section 307(b)(1)'s venue rule is jurisdictional.
b.

The Venue Rule with Respect to the ProperCircuit Court ofAppeals

Section 307(b)(1) specifies two venue choices with respect to which court
of appeals should entertain a petition for review. 295 In the first part of that section, Congress directs that EPA final actions issued pursuant to certain specified
sections, as well as "any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or
286. Harrison,446 U.S. at 593-94. This is likely why many circuit courts cite section 307(b)(1) as
the basis for their jurisdiction.
287. Id.at 593.
288. Id.
at 584.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
at 584-85; see also Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 776 (1977) (CAA Amendments of 1977).
293. See Harrison,446 U.S. at 584-94.
294. Id.at 593. The D.C. Circuit had also previously found that the district courts were without
jurisdiction to hear appeals of CAA actions listed in section 307(b)(1). See Oljato Chapter of Navajo
Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[Olur reading of this court's exclusive [s]ection
307 jurisdiction in this case necessarily ousts [d]istrict [c]ourt jurisdiction ....
").Congress wanted
"even and consistent national application" of national standards of performance by giving the courts of
appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review such standards. S. REP. No.91-1196, at 41 (1970).
295. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012); see also supra notes 57, 59, 63 and accompanying text to review the complete text of this section.
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final action taken" under the CAA "may be filed only" in the D.C. Circuit.2 96
In the next part of section 307(b)(1), Congress directs review of certain EPA
actions (including the approval or disapproval of SIPs and specified regulations) that are "locally or regionally applicable" to be filed only in the court of
appeals "for the appropriate circuit. ' 29 7 Congress also empowered EPA to direct actions to the D.C. Circuit if EPA's action is "based on a determination of
nationwide scope or effect," provided that EPA "finds and publishes that such
298
action is based on such a determination."
The question here is whether section 307(b)(l)'s delegation of certain petitions to the D.C. Circuit and other petitions to the "appropriate circuit" is jurisdictional. In other words, is the D.C. Circuit without jurisdiction to hear a petition concerning a "locally or regionally applicable" action? Similarly, does a
circuit (other than the D.C. Circuit) have jurisdiction to hear a "nationally applicable" action? Relatedly, can there be a waiver of these requirements?
Although Congress did use mandatory language that petitions "may only
be filed" in a particular circuit court of appeals, this language does not necessarily mean that Congress intended it to be jurisdictional. In fact, the explicit
use of the term "venue" suggests that Congress wanted these requirements to
work like typical venue provisions that could be subject to waiver, if not objected to, and also be eligible for transfer, if filed in the wrong court of appeals.
Thus, the legislative history of the 1977 CAA Amendments that revised section
307(b)(1) demonstrates that Congress did not clearly intend to make these venue provisions jurisdictional.
In its report that accompanied its proposed CAA amendments, the House's
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee proposed changes to the administrative and judicial review provisions of the CAA. 2 9 9 One of its proposals was
"intended to clarify some questions relating to venue for review of rules or orders under the act." 30 0 The committee explained that its amendment to add the
first sentence of section 307(b)(1) would make "it clear that any nationally applicable regulations promulgated by the Administrator under the Clean Air Act
could be reviewed only in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." 30 1 Later, when explaining its proposal for actions "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect," the committee specifically stated that "ex-

296. § 7607(b)(1).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299.
H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 318 (1977).
300. Id. at 322 (emphasis added); see also Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 590 (1980)
("[The committee] focused not on the jurisdictional question at issue here, but rather on the proper venue as between the District of Columbia Circuit and the other Federal Circuits.").
301.
H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 323.
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clusive venue for review is in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co' 302
lumbia[.]
The House Committee also noted that in suggesting these particular
amendments, it was "in large measure approving the portion of the Administrative Conference of the United States recommendation section 305.76-4(a), that
deals with venue." 30 3 Congress created the Administrative Conference of the
United States to "study the efficiency, adequacy and fairness of ...administrative procedures." 304 Section 305.76-4 of the Conference report 30 5 found that
"Congress [had] enacted provisions for judicial review in the Clean Air Act and
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) that [were] in some respects
30 6
inconsistent, incomplete, ambiguous, and unsound."
The Conference noted that the FWPCA and CAA differed with respect to
where challenges could be brought. 307 The FWPCA allowed national standards
to be reviewed in a circuit "in which a petitioner resides or transacts business. ' 308 On the other hand, most national CAA standards could only be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit. 30 9 The Conference asserted that this "inconsistency
in approach should be resolved" and that the FWPCA venue provision should
be amended to correspond to the CAA provision. 3 10 Thus, in its "Recommendation" section, the Conference called for "Venue in the Court of Appeals,"
31
which the House Committee specifically adopted. 1
In sum, in proposing these amendments to section 307(b)(1), which were
later adopted, the cominittee spoke in unmistakable language that it viewed section 307(b)(1)'s venue rule as merely a venue clause and not a jurisdictional
rule.

302. Id. at 324 (emphasis added). In that respect, if each of the venue rules were jurisdictional, it
would allow EPA to essentially "create" jurisdiction in the D.C. Circuit by designating an action as
based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect. Arguably, it would be impermissible for EPA to
do so because only Congress can create the jurisdiction of federal courts. See U.S. CONST. art. I11,
§ 1;
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 217 (2007) ("Only Congress may determine a lower federal court's
subject-matter jurisdiction." (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004))). But see S.REP. No.
91-1196, at 41 (1970) (placing jurisdiction in "the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Circuit in which the
affected air quality control region, or portion thereof, is located").
303. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 324.
304. Miscellaneous Amendments, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,767, 56,767 (Dec. 30, 1976) (to be codified at I
C.F.R. pts. 305, 310).
305.
The Conference report was titled "Judicial Review under the Clean Air Act and Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Recommendation No. 76-4)."
306. ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND
FEDERAL

WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 1 (1976),

default/files/documents/76-4-ss.pdf.
307. Id. at 1-2.
308. Id. at 1.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 2.
311. Id. at 4; H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 324 (1977).

available at https://www.acus.gov/sites/
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The Context of the Venue Rule within the Clean Air Act

Although the text of section 307(b)(1), when viewed in light of its legislative history, clearly demonstrates a lack of congressional intent to make the
"choice of circuit" venue rule in section 307(b)(1) jurisdictional, the context of
that rule in section 307(b)(1) further demonstrates that it is not jurisdictional.
Congress also subsequently authorized courts to transfer petitions that were
filed in the wrong circuit, which ensured that the venue rule remained, in effect,
a non-jurisdictional provision, regardless of whether courts had interpreted the
venue rule as being jurisdictional.
As courts have observed, when viewed in the context of section 307(b),
the venue rule is more logically "read as prescribing the choice among circuits
and not the power of a particular federal circuit court to hear a claim." 3 12 In
other words, Congress intended the courts of appeals to hear petitions for review of EPA decisions under the CAA. By contrast, the "choice of circuit" rule
here addresses in which circuit court a party must file. Although Congress
clearly intended to have the D.C. Circuit be the location where nationally significant EPA actions be heard and allocated local cases to the regional circuit, it
does not naturally follow that Congress intended to deny a different circuit the
3 13
power to entertain such a petition.
The fact that Congress gave EPA the ability to direct certain petitions to
the D.C. Circuit supports the conclusion that these rules are merely venue rules.
If EPA makes an affirmative published finding that one of its actions is "based
on a determination of nationwide scope or effect[,J" a petition may then only be
filed in the D.C. Circuit. 3 14 EPA's power to redirect cases to the D.C. Circuit,
which EPA maintains is not subject to judicial review, demonstrates that Congress intended EPA to have a voice as to where proper venue should lie. 315 In
other words, Congress empowered EPA to have some discretion in selecting
venue, rather than requiring venue to be established only through a unilateral
and mandatory statutory rule. Thus, it does not appear that Congress was so
concerned about which circuit heard a petition that it wanted a petition filed in
an incorrect circuit to be jurisdictionally deficient. Congress therefore likely
viewed it as reasonable that EPA, like a typical defendant, would be subject to
waiver if it failed to make a timely objection to a petition for review that was
filed in an improper venue, rather than have an improperly filed petition be a
defect that could be raised at any time during the litigation.
Moreover, Congress was likely aware that courts can transfer petitions that
are filed in the wrong circuit using their inherent power to transfer cases "upon

312.
313.
314.
315.
an initial
ble.").

Tex. Mon. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
See id
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012).
Id; see Am. Rd. & Transp. Builders Ass'n v. EPA, 705 F.3d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("As
matter, EPA asserts that its decision whether to make such a finding is not judicially reviewa-
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a finding that such transfer [is] in the interests of justice and in accord with
sound principles of judicial administration." 316 Indeed, in an unpublished opinion involving the venue rule in section 307(b)(1), the Fourth Circuit noted this
317
ability.
Congress may have also been aware that courts were wrongly construing
venue provisions, such as section 307(b)(1), as jurisdictional. In the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Congress "cured" these mistakes by enacting
28 U.S.C. § 1631, "Transfer to cure want of jurisdiction," which would allow a
court to transfer a case to either the D.C. Circuit or to a more appropriate circuit. 3 18 It provides:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section
610 of this title or an appeal, including a petition for review of
administrative action, is noticed for or filed with such a court
and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the
court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action
or appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal
could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed,
and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in
or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date
upon which it was actually3 1filed
in or noticed for the court
9
from which it is transferred.
The legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982
demonstrates that Congress recognized that because of "the complexity of the
federal court system and of special jurisdictional provisions," cases were being
filed in the wrong court. 320 And by the time such an error was discovered, "the
statute of limitations or a filing period may have expired," and parties had to
32 1
incur additional costs "by having to file [a] case anew in the proper court."
Congress specifically highlighted that this "problem has been particularly acute
in the area of administrative law where misfilings and dual filings have become
commonplace." 322 Thus, in order to obviate "the wasteful and costly [protec316.

W. Va. Chamber of Commerce v. Browner, No. 98-1013, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 37207, at

*4 (4th Cir. Dec. 1, 1998).
317. Id.(listing cases in eight circuits, including the First, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits,
that have held that courts of appeals have inherent power to transfer cases); see, e.g., Dombusch v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue Serv., 860 F.2d 611,614-15 (5th Cir. 1988); Alexander v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 825 F.2d 499, 501-02 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Clark & Reid Co. v. United States, 804 F.2d 3,
7 (1st Cir. 1986); Pearce v. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 771 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979);
Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 337 F.2d 249, 252 (10th Cir. 1964).
318. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012); see Browner, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 37207, at *4 ("If we were to
find that we lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we could transfer the case to a court that did have subject
matter jurisdiction (and venue) in the interests of justice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 .").
319. § 1631.
320. S.REP. No. 97-275, at 30 (1981).
321. Id.
322. Id.
at 11; see, e.g., ATK Launch Sys., Inc. v. EPA, 651 F.3d 1194, 1196 n.1(10th Cir. 2011)
("A protective petition has been timely filed in the D.C. Circuit, thus eliminating any concern about the
statute of limitations, and no argument has been made that any venue objection has been waived.").
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tive device] of filing in two or more courts at the same time," a transfer statute
was necessary to relieve the "burdens on the courts as well as on the par32 3
ties."
Under this provision, a circuit court with an otherwise valid petition for
review (such as one that was filed within the filing deadline) could transfer the
case to a court with proper venue if the court finds it is "in the interest of justice" to do so. 3 2 4 Given Congress's intention that it is important to give parties
the ability to seek judicial review under the CAA, it seems clear that cases
would be transferred to the correct circuit court under either method. Indeed,
one circuit court, after concluding that proper venue lay in the D.C Circuit,
found that it was "in the interests of justice and in accord with principles of
sound judicial administration to transfer [the] case to the D.C. Circuit" 32 5 because if it had dismissed the case the petitioner would have run afoul of the filing deadline of section 307(b)(1) when it attempted to refile the case in the
proper venue.
Finally, the same sovereign immunity concerns outlined above, which
support a conclusion that the filing deadline is jurisdictional, are not present
when determining whether the venue rule is jurisdictional. Because Congress
provided a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for EPA final actions to be
challenged in the courts of appeals, there is little difference as to whether EPA
has to defend its action in the D.C. Circuit or another circuit court. Without a
clear indication that Congress wished the choice of circuit to be an essential element of the waiver, the requirement is more logically viewed as a traditional
venue rule.
3.

The HistoricalTreatment of Venue Rules

The historical treatment of similar rules reinforces the conclusion that the
section 307(b)(1) circuit selection venue rule is not jurisdictional. In short,
"venue rules have long been understood as non-jurisdictional" and can be
waived. 326 As one court explained: "[i]t would be usurpative for a federal court

323. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 11. Importantly, it specified that the transferee court should use the
date that the petition was filed in the wrong circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1631. The Senate Report stated, "The
case would be treated by the transferee court as though it had been initially filed there on the date to pay
any additional filing fees. This provision is broadly drafted to allow transfer between any two federal
courts." S. REP. No. 97-275, at 30.
324. 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
325. W. Va. Chamber of Commerce v. Browner, No. 98-1013, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 37207, at
*8 (4th Cir. Dec. 1, 1998); see also ATK Launch Sys., 651 F.3d at 1196 n. I ("This court has the power to
transfer the case either way.").
326. Clean Water Action Council of Ne. Wis., Inc. v. EPA, 765 F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979)); see Henderson ex rel. Henderson v.
Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011) ("When 'a long line of this Court's decisions left undisturbed by
Congress' has treated a similar requirement as 'jurisdictional,' we will presume that Congress intended
to follow that course." (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen Gen.
Comm., 558 U.S. 67, 82 (2009))); WRIGHT, MILLER& COOPER, supra note 266, § 3829.
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to assert jurisdiction over a case that the Constitution or statute had consigned
to a state court, or even for a federal district court to assert jurisdiction over a
case that should have been brought in a federal court of appeals ..... 327 However, it reasoned that "it is not usurpative for one federal court of appeals to assert jurisdiction (because of absence of objection) over a case that it would
have been authorized to adjudicate if only the effects of the order sought to be
328
reviewed had been felt in one part of the country rather than another."
Furthermore, Congress knows how to give a venue provision the stature of
a jurisdictional limitation, including specifying that a particular court (as a matter of venue) has jurisdiction. For example, in 28 U.S.C. § 1365, Congress provided that "[t]he United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall
have original jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy, over
any civil action" brought by the Senate with respect to certain matters. 329 The
venue requirement within this provision is inextricably linked with the federal
district court of the District of Columbia's subject-matter jurisdiction to hear
specified cases. No such specificity exists in section 307(b)(1) to conclude that
Congress clearly intended the delegation of certain cases to specific courts of
appeals to be jurisdictional.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that Congress intended section 307(b)(1)'s filing deadline to be
jurisdictional. Consistent with the U.S. Constitution, it is up to Congress to determine the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 330 The power to "also determine
when, and under what conditions" the federal courts exercise this jurisdiction
follows afortiori from this power. 3 3 1 Although it is tempting to characterize
filing deadlines as claim-processing rules, "it is no less 'jurisdictional' when
Congress prohibits federal courts from adjudicating an otherwise legitimate
'class of cases' after a certain period has elapsed from final judgment. '332 And
it makes sense to do so. Basic goals of administrative law are served by construing such requirements, such as a filing deadline to challenge regulations, as
jurisdictional. For example, such rules serve "the important purpose of imparting finality into the administrative process." 333 This not only conserves administrative resources, but also protects "the reliance interests" of parties that con334
form to regulation.

327. New York v. EPA, 133 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Missouri v. United States, 109
F.3d 440 (8th Cir. 1997)).
328. Id.
329. 28 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
330. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007).
331.
Id.
at 212-13 (citing United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. 106, 113 (1848)).
332.

333.
1981).
334.

Id. at213.

Natural Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 666 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir.
Id.
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It is also equally clear that the "choice of circuit" rule in section 307(b)(1)
is not jurisdictional. Rather, it is an ordinary venue provision that can be
waived. The legislative history of this provision explicitly demonstrates Congress's clear intent that these venue rules be regarded as non-jurisdictional. And
although subject to waiver by EPA, cases not filed in the appropriate circuit can
nonetheless find their way back to the circuit that Congress prescribed through
either 28 U.S.C. § 1631 or through the courts' inherent power to transfer cases.
In the end, this fosters Congress's goal of having cases heard in its preferred
forum without the ill effects of characterizing a rule as "jurisdictional."

We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our
online companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@boalt.org.
Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq.
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